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Abstract In the near future, robotic agents might employ
persuasion to influence people’s behavior or attitudes, just
as human agents do in many situations. People can comply
with these requests, but, people can also experience psycho-
logical reactance, which may lead to the complete opposite
of the proposed behavior. In this study we are interested in
the social nature of psychological reactance. Social agency
theory proposes that more social cues lead to a more social
interaction. We argue that this also holds for psychological
reactance. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship be-
tween the level of social agency of the source of a persua-
sive message and the amount of psychological reactance the
message arouses. In an online experiment, participants read
an advice on how to conserve energy when using a washing
machine. The advice was either provided as text-only, as text
accompanied by a still picture of a robotic agent, or as text
accompanied by a short film clip of the same robotic agent.
Confirming our expectations, results indicated that partici-
pants experienced more psychological reactance when the
advice was accompanied by the still picture or when the ad-
vice was accompanied by the short film clip as compared
to when the advice was provided as text-only. This indi-
cates that stronger social agency of the messenger can lead
to more psychological reactance. Furthermore, our results
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confirmed earlier research about the effects of controlling
language on psychological reactance. Implications are dis-
cussed.
Keywords Persuasive agents · Psychological reactance ·
Intentionality · Social influence · Energy conservation
behavior
1 Introduction
In the near future, robotic agents might employ persuasion
to influence people’s behavior or attitudes, just as human
agents do in many situations. That is, in many day-to-day sit-
uations human agents use persuasion to influence other peo-
ple (e.g., in health campaigns, political campaigns, environ-
mental campaigns), but the effects of persuasion may some-
times be quite different from what was intended. For in-
stance, persuasion can be used through environmental cam-
paigns in which people are persuaded to conserve energy,
recycle and to keep the environment clean. Indeed, all the
people you interact with are, most of the time, skillful per-
suaders. Your partner wants you to bring out the garbage,
your child keeps whining for that expensive new toy and
your parents really need your help in repairing the car. What
all these acts of persuasion have in common is that people
can experience psychological reactance in response to these
persuasive appeals.
When people are the subject of persuasion, they are di-
rected to perform a specific behavior or adapt an attitude.
In response to persuasive messages, people can comply and
adapt their behavior or attitude in the desired direction.
However, people might also experience psychological re-
actance, which could lead to the complete opposite of the
intended behavior. People become psychologically reactant
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when they experience a persuasive message as a threat to
their autonomy. Consequently, they feel the urge to defend
their autonomy and do the opposite of whatever the persua-
sive message directed them to do [3]. So, when people are
persuaded to exercise—and they experience psychological
reactance as a response—they might do the opposite and
watch TV instead. Although earlier research assessed reac-
tance in human–human interactions, in which the persuasive
social agent was always human, for an overview see [7], one
can imagine that experiences of reactance will also occur
when people are being persuaded by artificial social agents
in human-computer interactions. In the current study, we
will investigate whether an artificial social agent can trig-
ger psychological reactance. In the current paper we argue
that reactance effects occur when an artificial social agent is
perceived to have stronger social agency. Therefore, we will
present participants with artificial social agents with differ-
ent levels of social agency.
1.1 Psychological Reactance
Psychological reactance has been investigated primarily in
research instigated by the theory of psychological reactance
[3]. According to this theory [3], persuasive attempts may
fail if they are experienced as an intrusion on people’s au-
tonomy. As a response to such attempts, people can experi-
ence a strong desire to restore this feeling of autonomy [3].
This is in line with self-determination theory [26] that states
that one of the basic humans needs is the need for autonomy.
The theory of psychological reactance argues that the fol-
lowing elements are relevant to reactance (also see Fig. 1);
(1) a perceived autonomy1 (e.g., autonomy to choose cof-
fee or tea at a conference), (2) a threat2 to that perceived
autonomy (e.g., a waitress persuading you to drink coffee),
(3) the experience of psychological reactance (i.e., as indi-
cated by feelings of anger and negative cognitions), and (4) a
desire to restore the threatened autonomy (e.g., asking for
tea instead of coffee). The restoration of autonomy can oc-
cur directly, by doing the forbidden act; or indirectly by an
increase of attractiveness or liking for the eliminated option
[5], by denying the existence of the threat to autonomy, by
exercising a similar autonomy to gain a feeling of control,
or by derogating the source, described in [8].
Recent work has investigated the effect of message for-
mulation on psychological reactance, e.g. [6, 8, 9, 17, 19,
21–23, 25]. This research indicates that when language be-
comes more controlling, people are more prone to respond in
1The original theory of psychological reactance [3] speaks of perceived
freedom instead of perceived autonomy. However, we deem autonomy
a more concrete concept than freedom, and we will use this term in the
rest of the paper.
2In this article the term “threat” is always referred to as an intrusion to
one’s autonomy to choose.
Fig. 1 Psychological reactance model
a reactant way. For example, research by Grandpre and col-
leagues [6] found that adolescents who were provided with
explicit (i.e., containing clear intentions) messages against
smoking showed more signs of psychological reactance and
initiated more smoking behavior than when these adoles-
cents who were provided with implicit messages (i.e., con-
taining no clear intentions) against smoking. Intriguingly,
this effect was also observed for pro-smoking messages; af-
ter receiving explicit messages in favor of smoking, partic-
ipants became more psychologically reactant and engaged
in less smoking behavior. These results suggest that persua-
sive actors should consider their message formulation when
conveying a persuasive message.
A study by Miller and colleagues [17] provided insights
in the underlying processes leading to psychological reac-
tance. This research indicated that the use of concrete (de-
scriptive) language that avoids any doubts about the mean-
ing of the message, resulted in more compliant behavior.
However, when a message contains controlling language
(i.e., containing explicit directives) persuasion was dimin-
ished and psychological reactance was enhanced. Specifi-
cally, Miller and colleagues’ results [17] indicate that high-
controlling language makes use of imperatives (i.e., com-
mands and orders) and controlling terms such as “have
to”, “must”, “should”, “ought to”, or “need to”. On the
other hand, low-controlling language makes use of terms
like (i.e., suggestions) “could”, “can”, “may”, “might”, or
“could try to” [17]. High-controlling messages are directive
and clearly show the persuaders intentions, whereas lowly
controlling messages are experienced more as suggestions
and as autonomy-supportive [17]. In short, Miller and col-
leagues [17] showed that when using a (low-controlling)
concrete message, persuasion will be enhanced. But when
the same message contains high-controlling language, com-
pliance will decrease and such a message might even lead to
psychological reactance.
1.2 Psychological Reactance as a Measurable Concept
Psychological reactance can be measured by assessing feel-
ings of anger and negative cognitions. That is, in the origi-
nal theory of psychological reactance, Brehm and Brehm [4]
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explained that psychological reactance cannot be measured
directly because it is a motivational state that is the conse-
quence of a threat to autonomy. However, a recent study by
Dillard and Shen [8] proposed a different conceptual per-
spective on psychological reactance to make it measurable.
In their study, they present two concepts that could be used
as indicators of psychological reactance; anger and nega-
tive cognitions. Further research showed that these two fac-
tors could be explained best by an intertwined model—the
two indicators contributed to psychological reactance in an
intermingling way [8, 21, 23]. That is, anger and negative
cognitions were best explained as an inseparable construct.
The implication of the intertwined model is that one should
assess both anger and negative cognitions when measuring
psychological reactance. Moreover, research indicated that
there exists a relationship between the message that con-
tains a threat-to-autonomy-of-choice and attitude, as well as
a relationship between the message that contains a threat-to-
autonomy-of-choice and behavioral intentions. That is, re-
sults indicated that participants who read a high-threat mes-
sage had a more negative attitude towards the advocated
behavior (e.g., responsible drinking) in the message, and
had lower behavioral intentions in line with the advocated
behavior (e.g., responsible drinking) than participants who
read a low-threat message. In addition, it was found that this
relationship was (almost) fully mediated by anger and nega-
tive cognitions [8, 21, 23].
1.3 Psychological Reactance and Social Influence
In the current article, we suggest that psychological reac-
tance is a social phenomenon that is the outcome of an in-
teraction between social agents. That is, we argue that psy-
chological reactance occurs primarily when a social agent
causes the threat to autonomy of choice. This is in line with
Brehm [3], who stated that “. . .reactance will frequently oc-
cur in response to restrictions or threats thereof imposed
by social entities, and that the general effect of reactance
is to produce tendencies to oppose the actual or threatened
restrictions” (p. 387). We believe that when the cause of a
threat to one’s autonomy of choice is not another social be-
ing but a non-social entity, we argue, no psychological reac-
tance might occur. For example, imagine that while driving
your car you come to a point where you can either go right
or left and you know that both ways are equally short and
you do not have a preference to go one way or the other.
But before you make your choice, the road to the right gets
blocked by a tree (a non-social entity) that is struck by light-
ning. In this situation there is a threat to your choice to go
to the right. This will most likely cause frustration, but not
psychological reactance, in which a desire is experienced
to restore that threat to your autonomy of choice. However,
when you have the choice to go to the right or left, and a per-
son (a social agent) tries to persuade you to go to the right,
you can experience psychological reactance and maybe even
turn left. Thus, in the current research it is proposed that psy-
chological reactance can be attributed to the influence of the
social agency of the source of a persuasive message. Consis-
tent with social agency theory [16], we use the term social
agency to indicate the degree to which a social agent is per-
ceived as a social entity. In other words, the degree to which
a social agent is perceived as being capable of social behav-
ior that resembles human-human interaction, see also [24].
Especially in situations in which humans interact with artifi-
cial social agents (e.g., a virtual agent, or a robot), we argue
that this issue is relevant. We think that also in these kinds of
interactions, the social agency of the source of a persuasive
message is important for the occurrence of psychological
reactance in response to that message. Support for this hy-
pothesis, can be found in the Computers are Social Actors
paradigm (CASA paradigm) [24], which states that people
react to computers as if they were reacting to other people.
The theory behind the CASA paradigm is based on a theory
by Langer [12] about mindlessness behavior. When in a state
of mindlessness, people act on automatic pilot and do not
think consciously about their behavior. Attention is directed
to information that is relevant for the current task, leaving
no room for alternative information [12]. It is suggested that
when people interact with computers, they mindlessly form
a premature commitment to social scripts of human-human
interaction experienced in the past [18]. In short, the CASA
paradigm [24] suggests that social cues trigger social rules
and people react in accordance with these social rules. We
suggest that this also holds for the social rules of psycholog-
ical reactance. Therefore, we expect that an artificial social
agent can also trigger psychological reactance.
In addition, Social Agency Theory [16] and the Social-
Cue Hypothesis [13] state that the more social cues (e.g.,
voice, presence of a face, face expressions) are available
in an interaction, the more social the interaction becomes.
That is, the interaction is experienced to a higher degree
as a human-human interaction. Various studies confirm this
theory. Additionally, when more social cues are available,
people try to understand the relationship with the other ac-
tor better [13, 16]. One example that demonstrates this, is a
study by Hone [11], which suggests that using an embodied
agent (virtual agent & text-bulb) leads to a greater influence
of the embodied agent on participants’ attitudes compared
to participants who were provided with a text box only. In
other words, the virtual agent had a greater influence on the
participants, which could be caused by the experience of a
more social interaction. Also, research indicates that the vi-
sual presence of a high- social agent (i.e., a fully embodied
agent) led to a better performance than when this agent was
not visually present [15]. Furthermore, research concludes
that a more realistic interaction leads to a greater influence
of the agent [2, 10] see also [24]. Therefore, we propose that
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the more social the source of a message is (i.e., displaying
more social cues), the more a persuasive message by that
source can give rise to psychological reactance.
1.4 The Current Research
The current study assessed the influence of the social agency
of the source of a persuasive message on psychological reac-
tance in response to that message. To study this question, we
investigated psychological reactance in response to a persua-
sive message coming from either an artificial agent depicted
on a short film clip; a persuasive message coming from an
artificial agent depicted by a still picture; or a persuasive
message consisting of text only.
The persuasive message in this study consisted of an ad-
vice that persuaded people to conserve energy when using
a washing machine. Threat to autonomy was induced by
providing participants with either a high-threat advice (e.g.,
“The washing machine uses a lot of energy, so you really
have to set the temperature to 40 °C instead of always set-
ting it to 60 °C.”), a low-threat advice (e.g., “The washing
machine uses a lot of energy, so you could consider to set
the temperature to 40 °C now and then instead of 60 °C.”),
or a no-threat advice (e.g., “The washing machine uses a lot
of energy. People could save energy by setting the temper-
ature to 40 °C instead of 60 °C.”). In all conditions we used
concrete language to avoid any doubt about the meaning of
the advice [17]. We expected that a high-threat advice would
lead to more psychological reactance (i.e., negative cogni-
tions and feelings of anger) than a low-threat advice, which
in turn would lead to more psychological reactance than a
no-threat advice (hypothesis 1). The key hypothesis of the
current study, however, investigates whether the more social
cues the source of a message expresses (i.e., the more social
agency the source of a message has), the more a persuasive
message by that source will give rise to psychological reac-
tance. We manipulated social agency by providing partici-
pants either with; an advice as text-only (low social agency
condition) or an advice accompanied by a still picture of
the message source (i.e., the artificial agent; medium social
agency condition). This manipulation is based on earlier re-
search by Hone [11] that indicated that people are influenced
more by a text that is accompanied by a picture than by a text
that is not accompanied by a picture. In addition, we added
a condition in which even more agency might be ascribed
to the social agent. That is, in a third condition we provide
participants with an advice accompanied by a moving pic-
ture of the message source (high social agency condition). In
this condition the mouth of the message source moved as if
it was talking. This implies that the message is originated by
the message source. Social Agency Theory [16] states that
the higher the amount of social cues that can be perceived,
the higher the level of social agency that people can ascribe,
meaning that people experience the social agent more as a
social entity (i.e., human). Hence, we argue that the addi-
tional social cue of facial movement will heighten the level
of social agency that people ascribe, which consequently
can lead to an increase in psychological reactance. In other
words, people experience the interaction more as a human-
human interaction when the social agent is capable of mov-
ing than when it is a still picture, which thus increases social
agency. Therefore, we expected that participants who were
provided a persuasive message from a source depicted by a
short film clip would experience more reactance than partic-
ipants who were provided with a persuasive message from a
source depicted by a still picture, who in turn would expe-
rience more reactance than participants who were provided
with a persuasive message consisting of text only (hypoth-
esis 2). Furthermore, we expected an interaction between
threat level and social agency level, leading to the strongest
effect of psychological reactance when high threat would
co-occur with high social agency (hypothesis 3). Finally, in
line with previous research [8, 21, 23], we expected a posi-
tive relationship between threat to autonomy and restoration
intentions, and that this relationship would be mediated by
psychological reactance (hypothesis 4).
2 Method
2.1 Participants and Design
One hundred and thirty-eight participants (70 males, 68 fe-
males; age M = 35.2, SD = 15.6) were randomly assigned
to one of nine experimental conditions of a 3 (threat level:
no threat vs. low threat vs. high threat) ×3 (social agency
level: low social agency vs. medium social agency vs. high
social agency) design. The dependent variable consisted of
(the two types of) psychological reactance; a score indicat-
ing the amount of feelings of anger and a score indicating
the amount of negative cognitions. Participants were mainly
recruited on the Internet via a Web link. All participants
were native Dutch speakers. The experiment lasted about 15
minutes, for which participants were paid 3 Euros (approx-
imately $3.75 U.S. at the time this study was conducted),
and participants were provided with the opportunity to win
an additional price of 100 Euros (approximately $125 U.S.).
2.2 Materials
The specific text we used in this experiment to give par-
ticipants advice (the advisory text) described energy con-
servation while using a washing machine. This advisory
text either contained non-controlling language (e.g., “People
could save energy when using the washing machine.”), low-
controlling language (e.g., “You could save energy when
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using the washing machine.”), or high-controlling language
(e.g., “You have to save energy when using the washing ma-
chine.”). The language use in the advisory texts was based
on previous studies about psychological reactance [8, 17,
19]. For some participants, the advisory text was not accom-
panied by a picture (low social agency). This advisory text
was presented as text-only. For other participants, the advi-
sory text was accompanied by a still picture (medium social
agency; see Picture 1).
Picture 1 The Medium Social
Agency condition
The still picture showed a robotic agent (i.e., the virtual
iCat), and this robotic agent had a neutral expression on its
face. A speech-bulb connected the robotic agent with the
words of the advisory text, implying that the robotic agent
was uttering the words. And for the final third of partici-
pants, the advisory text was accompanied by a short film clip
(high social agency). The short film clip showed the identi-
cal robotic agent (i.e., the virtual iCat) without emotional
expressions, but now the mouth of the robotic agent made
speech movements indicating that it was saying the words.3
(see procedure for further details).
To check the effect of our manipulation of threat level,
participants were asked to answer four questions that mea-
sured perceived threat to autonomy. This measure was the
Dutch translation of a measure of perceived threat to free-
dom developed by Dillard and Shen [8]. For each question,
participants could indicate their agreement to a statement on
a five-point Likert scale, ranging from (1) Completely dis-
agree to (5) Completely agree. These four statements were:
“The advice restricted me in my autonomy to choose how I
wanted to do the laundry”, “The advice tried to manipulate
me”, “The advice tried to make a decision for me”, and “The
advice tried to pressure me”. A participant’s mean score on
these four statements formed a reliable (alpha = 0.90) mea-
sure for perceived threat to autonomy.
To measure feelings of anger (the one part of our mea-
surement of psychological reactance), participants were
asked to answer four questions that measured feelings of
anger. This measure was the Dutch translation of a mea-
sure of anger developed by Dillard and Shen [8]. For each
question, participants could indicate their agreement to a
statement on a four-point Likert scale ranging from (1) Not
3No actual sound was played, only the mouth moved.
at all to (4) Completely. These four statements were: “I was
irritated”, “I was angry”, “I was annoyed”, and “I was ag-
gravated”. A participant’s mean score on these four state-
ments formed a reliable (alpha = 0.83) measure for feelings
of anger.
To measure negative cognitions (the other part of our
measurement of psychological reactance), participants were
asked to perform a thought-listing task. This task was based
on a measure that was used in Dillard and Shen [8] and
translated in Dutch. In this task, participants were asked to
type all the thoughts they had while reading the advice text,
even if those thoughts had nothing to do with the advice
text (the amount of thoughts the participants typed ranged
from 1 to 10, with M = 3.2, SD = 1.9). There was no time
limit, and participants could type as much as they want in
a text box. After listing all thoughts, participants had to in-
dicate whether a thought was either negative (by typing an
“N” behind that thought description), positive (by typing a
“P ” behind that thought description), or neutral (by typing
“Neu” behind that thought description). Examples of nega-
tive thoughts that participants reported were “I don’t HAVE
TO do anything”, and “Unfriendly tone of speaking”. We
followed the procedure of Dillard and Shen [8] for remov-
ing emotions to minimize overlap between affect and cog-
nition in the reported thoughts. To calculate the “negative
cognitions score”, the total amount of negative cognitions
was divided by the total amount of all thoughts times 100;
this resulted in the percentage of negative cognitions.
To measure restoration intentions, the Reactance Restora-
tion Scale (RRS) [20] was administered. This measure con-
sists of three questions and uses a seven-point continuum,
with the following anchor points “motivated–unmotivated”,
“determined–not determined”, “encouraged–not encour-
aged”, and “inspired–not inspired”. The following three
items were assessed: “Right now, I am [. . .] to save en-
ergy when doing the laundry” (reversed scored; boomerang
restoration), “Right now, I am [. . .] to be around others
that save energy when doing the laundry” (reversed scored;
vicarious boomerang restoration), and “Right now, I am
[. . .] to do something totally energy consuming” (related
boomerang restoration).4 The mean score of the boomerang
restoration items formed a reliable (alpha = 0.92) for the
boomerang restoration score; the mean score of the vicari-
ous boomerang restoration items formed a reliable (alpha =
0.97) for the vicarious boomerang restoration score; and
the mean score of the related boomerang restoration items
formed a reliable (alpha = 0.97) for the related boomerang
restoration score.
4Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) with Oblimin rotation showed that the
three constructs were clearly empirically separable from each other,
with high factor loadings ranging from 0.78 to 0.97. This is in line
with earlier work by Quick and Stephenson [20].
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2.3 Procedure
Participants were invited to participate in an online experi-
ment on energy conservation. They were told that the study
was about behavior in the household. At the beginning of
the experiment, participants were given general introduc-
tions and were asked for their consent to proceed with the
experiment. After consent, participants were asked to read
an advisory text about energy conservation. Participants in
the no threat condition received the no threatening advisory
text, participants in the low threat condition received the
low-threatening advisory text, and participants in the high
threat condition received the high-threatening advisory text.
For some participants, the advisory text was either provided
as text-only (low social agency); for others the advisory
text was accompanied by a still picture of a robotic agent
(medium social agency; see Picture 1); and for the third part
of participants the advisory text was accompanied by a short
film clip, in which the same robotic agent moved its mouth
as if it was talking (high social agency).
After reading the advisory text, participants were asked to
perform the thought-listing task, and answer the questions
that measured feelings of anger, perceived threat to auton-
omy, and restoration intentions (see materials section).
Finally, participants were thanked for their participation




First, we checked whether our manipulation of threat level
was successful. To test this, the perceived threat of auton-
omy score was submitted to a Univariate Analysis of Vari-
ance (ANOVA), with threat level as the independent vari-
able. Confirming our hypothesis, this analysis showed a sig-
nificant effect of threat level, F(2,135) = 17.31, p < 0.01.
Pairwise comparison analyses indicated that participants in
the high threat condition reported more perceived threat to
autonomy (M = 3.44, SD = 1.21) than participants in the
low threat condition (M = 2.20, SD = 1.04), or no threat
condition (M = 2.28,SD = 1.00), both p’s < 0.01. How-
ever, these analyses did not indicate that participants in the
no threat condition reported a different perceived threat to
autonomy from participants in the low threat condition, n.s.
A possible explanation for this might be that the participants
may have experienced even the no-threat advisory text as
slightly threatening, because in this condition messages con-
taining general advice were also included in the text.
Second, we checked whether our manipulation of social
agency led to differences on a measure of experienced threat.
That is, to be able to ascribed effects of the manipulation of
agency to effects of social agency only, it is important that
this manipulation does not give rise to differences in experi-
enced threat. To test this, the perceived threat of autonomy
score was submitted to a Univariate Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA), with social agency level as the independent vari-
able. Confirming our expectations, this analysis showed that
the manipulation of social agency did not lead to differences
in the amount of experienced threat, n.s. This result suggests
that participants did not experience more threat when ex-
posed to a text accompanied by a social agent compared to a
text alone, indicating that the agent did not cause any threat
by itself.
Third, we investigated whether there were any gender dif-
ferences in the current study. To test this, we submitted the
negative cognitions score and feelings of anger score to a
3 (threat level: no threat vs. medium threat vs. high threat)
×3 (social agency level: low social agency vs. medium so-
cial agency vs. high social agency) ×2 (gender: male vs.
female) Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA). Re-
sults indicate that gender did not have a significant effect
on our two types of psychological reactance measures (i.e.,
negative cognitions and feelings of anger) nor did results
indicate any interaction effects with gender, all effects n.s.
However, results did indicate a significant Threat level X
Social agency level X Gender interaction, F(1,4) = 2,91,
p < 0.05, but in this analysis the amount of participants per
cell was too small (some cells containing less than 3 partic-
ipants) to draw firm conclusions about this result.
3.2 Threat
Our first hypothesis states that participants who received a
high-threat advisory text would report more feelings of psy-
chological reactance than participants who received a low-
threat advisory text, who in turn would report more feelings
of psychological reactance than participants who received a
no-threat advisory text. The negative cognitions score and
the feelings of anger score were submitted to a 3 (threat
level: no threat vs. low threat vs. high threat) ×3 (social
agency level: low social agency vs. medium social agency
vs. high social agency) Multivariate Analysis of Variance
(MANOVA). We treated the two types of psychological re-
actance as a repeated measures factor. In line with previ-
ous research, e.g., [8], we expected that participants in the
high-threat condition would have a higher psychological re-
actance score than participants in the low-threat condition,
and participants in the low-threat condition would have a
higher psychological reactance score than participants in
the no-threat condition. Confirming our expectations, results
showed that there was a significant main effect of threat
level, F(2,129) = 13.81, p < 0.01 (see Table 1 for the
mean scores and standard deviations).
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Table 1 Mean scores psychological reactance score (and standard deviations between brackets) in all conditions for the complete MANOVA
design
Threat Social agency
Low social agency Medium social agency High social agency
No threat 8.5 (11.4) 13.9 (13.9) 13.3 (17.9)
Low threat 9.7 (13.7) 15.9 (16.4) 22.4 (16.1)
High threat 24.0 (14.6) 31.0 (18.7) 31.6 (6.9)
Table 2 Means scores on the negative cognitions score and feelings of anger score (and standard deviations between brackets) for the threat
manipulation
Psychological reactance Threat
No threat Low threat High threat
Negative cognitions 21.5 (26.7)a 32.3 (32.2)a 54.0 (28.8)b
Anger 1.4 (0.5)a 1.4 (0.5)a 2.1 (0.7)b
Note: Mean scores in rows that do not share the same subscript differ significantly, p < 0.05
The pairwise comparisons for the main effect of threat
level, corrected using a Bonferroni adjustments, indicated
that participants in the high threat condition reported more
feelings of psychological reactance (M = 28.0, SD = 14.6)
than either participants in the low-threat condition (M =
16.9, SD = 16.2), p < 0.001, or participants in the no-
threat condition (M = 11.5, SD = 13.6), p < 0.001. How-
ever, there was no significant difference between the no-
threat condition and the low-threat condition, n.s. A con-
trast analysis demonstrated a linear trend of threat level, sug-
gesting that participants in the high-threat condition experi-
enced more psychological reactance (M = 28.9, SD = 13.6)
than participants in the low threat condition (M = 16.0,
SD = 15.5), who again reported more feelings of psycho-
logical reactance than participants in the no-threat condition
(M = 11.9, SD = 14.5), F(1,136) = 25.86, p < 0.01. Fur-
thermore, the effect of threat level was qualified by an in-
teraction of threat level X type of psychological reactance,
F(2,129) = 13.1, p < 0.01, indicating that the effect of
threat level is different on the measure of feelings of anger
than on the measure of negative cognitions. Closer examina-
tion of the separate effects on feelings of anger and negative
cognitions showed that the effect of threat level was signif-
icant for both measures, both p’s < 0.01, but, there was a
stronger effect of threat level on the measure of feelings of
anger, F(2,129) = 19.23, partial η2 = 0.23, than of threat
level on the measure of negative cognitions, F(2,129) =
13.47, partial η2 = 0.17 (see Table 2). Although the correla-
tion between negative cognitions and feelings of anger was
quit high (r = 0.61, p < 0.001) we still found a different ef-
fect on the two types of psychological reactance measures.
That is, it seems that the effects are not completely insepa-
rable. This result was a bit surprising, because previous re-
search by Dillard and Shen [8] suggests that the effects of
their distinct effects cannot be disentangled. However, these
authors do note in their discussion that this does not always
have to be the case, because “. . . cognition and affect are
phenomena of rapid change” [8, p. 160].
3.3 Social Agency
In our second hypothesis, we predicted that high social
agency would lead to more psychological reactance than
medium social agency, which in turn would lead to more
psychological reactance than low social agency. The
MANOVA analysis reported above was investigated for the
main effect of social agency level. Confirming our hypoth-
esis, results demonstrated that there was indeed a main
effect of social agency level on psychological reactance,
F(2,129) = 3.66, p = 0.03 (see Table 1 for mean scores
and standard deviations). The pairwise comparisons for the
main effect of social agency level, corrected using a Bon-
ferroni adjustments, indicated that the participants in the
low social agency condition experienced less psychological
reactance (text-only; M = 14.1, SD = 14.7) than partici-
pants in the high social agency condition (text-short film
clip; M = 22.9, SD = 15.7), p < 0.05. However, there
were no significant differences between the medium so-
cial agency condition and the high social agency condition,
n.s., nor between the low social agency condition and the
medium social agency condition, n.s. A contrast analysis
demonstrated a linear trend of social agency level, sug-
gesting that participants in the high social agency condi-
tion experienced more psychological reactance (M = 22.4,
SD = 13.8) than participants in the medium social agency
condition (M = 20.2, SD = 16.5), who again reported more
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Table 3 Means scores on the negative cognitions score and the feelings of anger score (and standard deviations between brackets) for the social
agency manipulation
Psychological reactance Social agency
Low social agency Medium social agency High social agency
Negative cognitions 26.6 (29.1)a 35.1 (33.8)b 44.1 (31.1)b
Anger 1.5 (0.6)a 1.6 (0.7)a 1.7 (0.6)a
Note: Mean scores in rows that do not share the same subscript differ significantly, p < 0.05
feelings of psychological reactance than participants in
the low social agency condition (M = 14.1, SD = 13.3),
F(1,136) = 6.64, p = 0.01. Furthermore, the effect of so-
cial agency was—just like the effect of threat on the two
types of psychological reactance measures—also qualified
by an interaction of social agency level X type of psycho-
logical reactance F(2,129) = 3.66, p < 0.05. Closer exam-
ination of this interaction indicated that social agency has an
effect on negative cognitions (F(2,129) = 3.66, p < 0.05),
but not on feelings of anger, n.s. More specifically, partic-
ipants in the low social agency experienced less negative
cognitions (M = 26.6, SD = 29.1), p = 0.05, than either
the participants in the medium social agency (M = 35.1), or
the high social agency condition (M = 44.1), p = <0.05.
Again, there were no significant differences between the
medium social agency condition and the high social agency
condition, n.s. (see Table 3).
3.4 Threat X Social Agency
Furthermore, we expected that there would be a signifi-
cant interaction effect of Threat level X Social agency level,
with the highest psychological reactance when a high threat
co-occurred with a high social agency. However, in the
MANOVA analysis reported above, the expected interaction
effect between threat level and social agency level was not
found, n.s. A possible explanation for this null effect could
be that our manipulation of social agency was not powerful
enough to elicit an additional effect on psychological reac-
tance.
3.5 Restoration
In accordance with previous research about psychological
reactance, we expected a positive relationship between per-
ceived threat of autonomy and restoration intentions, and
that this relationship would be mediated by psychological
reactance (see Fig. 1). We performed three separate analy-
ses for each restoration construct (i.e., boomerang, vicarious
boomerang, and related boomerang). However, we found no
relationship between threat and boomerang restoration, n.s.,
and no relationship between threat and related boomerang
restoration, n.s. Therefore, we only investigated the medi-
ation effect of psychological reactance on the relationship
between threat and vicarious boomerang restoration.
To examine this, we followed the steps of mediation
analysis developed by Baron and Kenny [1]. First, a lin-
ear regression analysis with threat level as the indepen-
dent variable and vicarious boomerang restoration as the
dependent variable showed a positive relationship between
threat and vicarious boomerang restoration (B = 0.35, SD =
0.17), t (137) = 2.08, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.03 (path c). Step
2 of the analysis is to check for a positive relationship be-
tween threat and psychological reactance (i.e., the com-
bined score of feelings of anger and negative cognitions).
Results showed that this was indeed the case (B = 8.15,
SD = 1.60), t (137) = 5.09, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.16 (path a).
Subsequently, we checked whether the mediator affected
the outcome. Results suggest that when entering vicarious
boomerang restoration as the dependent variable, and en-
tering psychological reactance and threat as the two in-
dependent variables, the outcome of psychological reac-
tance on vicarious boomerang restoration was affected (B =
0.02, SD = 0.01), t (137) = 2.47, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.07
(path b). This analysis further showed that the effect of
threat on vicarious boomerang restoration became non-
significant (B = 0.17, SD = 0.18), t (137) = 0.96, p > 0.1,
R2 = 0.07 (path c′). Because the effect of threat on vicarious
boomerang restoration became almost zero (i.e., B = 0.17),
this suggests a full mediation of psychological reactance on
the relationship between threat and restoration. A Sobel test
confirmed this suggestion, z = 2.20, p < 0.05. In short, it
seems that psychological reactance served as a mediator in
the relationship between threat to autonomy and vicarious
boomerang restoration.
4 Discussion
The current research investigated the influence of the social
agency of the source of a persuasive message on psycho-
logical reactance in response to that message. We expected
that the more social the source of a message is (i.e., display-
ing more social cues), the more a persuasive message by that
source will give rise to psychological reactance. In an online
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study, participants read an advice about how to save energy
when doing the laundry. This advice was either provided as
text-only, as text accompanied by a still picture of a robotic
agent, or as text accompanied by a short film clip of the
same robotic agent. Psychological reactance was measured
by assessing negative cognitions and feelings of anger. Con-
firming our expectations, results indicated that participants
who read an advice that was accompanied by a short film
clip showing a moving robotic agent experienced more psy-
chological reactance than participants who read an advice
that was accompanied by a still picture showing the same
robotic agent, who in turn experienced more psychological
reactance than participants that read an advice that was text-
only. These results indicate that stronger social agency of an
artificial agent can lead to more psychological reactance in
response to the persuasive message of that artificial agent.
So, intriguingly, even though our manipulation of social
agency was minimal (text-only vs. text with still picture vs.
text with short film clip), results indicate a significant differ-
ence of social agency on reported psychological reactance.
Especially the difference between the medium and high so-
cial agency condition was minimal: the only difference be-
tween these conditions was that in the high social agency
condition the agent moved its mouth as if it was talking. Fur-
thermore, we used a social agent that was non-human. Per-
haps a stronger social agency manipulation with even clearer
social cues (e.g., facial expressions, voice, more human-like
agent, gestures) would result in even higher amounts of psy-
chological reactance.
Moreover, we found that the effect of social agency was
only pronounced on one of the two reactance measure—
negative cognitions—but not on the measure of feelings of
anger. A possible explanation for this result could be that
our manipulation of social agency was not strong enough to
cause detectable effects on the feelings of anger measure.
Furthermore, results of the current study suggest that par-
ticipants who received a high-threat advice about energy
conservation showed more evidence of experiencing psy-
chological reactance than participants who received low-
threat advice or participants who received no-threat advice.
Different from the effect of social agency on the psycho-
logical reactance measures, which was only found on the
negative cognitions measure, the effect of threat to auton-
omy of the language in the advice was found both on the
measure for negative cognitions and the measure for feel-
ings of anger. This finding is in correspondence with ear-
lier research [8, 17, 19, 21, 23] that indicates that the use of
threatening language (threatening people’s autonomy) and
controlling language (using explicit directives) will dimin-
ish persuasion and enhance psychological reactance. More-
over, this finding was especially pronounced on the reac-
tance measure of feelings of anger, but also present on the
reactance measure of negative cognitions. This difference
is also found in a recent other study, which also showed
stronger effects related to psychological reactance on mea-
sures of anger than on measures of negative cognitions [19].
The manipulation of the amount of control (high-control-
ling vs. low-controlling vs. non-controlling), that is, threat to
autonomy, used in the current study did not seem to have an
influence on this relationship. Specifically, we did not find
the expected interaction between the amount of threat and
the level of social agency leading to the strongest reactance
when high threat co-occurred with high social agency. Inter-
estingly, a recent study did find some evidence that psycho-
logical reactance was aroused especially when a persuasive
agent was combined with explicitness [14].
Finally, in confirmation of our fourth hypothesis, results
indicated that the use of more controlling language led to
a higher amount of reported restoration intentions, and this
relationship was partially mediated by psychological reac-
tance. However, this mediation effect of psychological reac-
tance on the relationship between threat and restoration was
only found for the vicarious boomerang restoration. Future
research should investigate in which situation what type of
restoration is triggered. This finding is in correspondence
with previous research about psychological reactance [6],
for an overview see [7–9, 17, 19, 21–23].
4.1 Implications and Future Directions
Overall, these findings have several implications for both
the design of persuasive messages, as for the usage and de-
sign of an artificial agent that delivers these messages. If
we would like to develop persuasive technology to stimulate
people to diet, to stop smoking, or in the current research, to
conserve energy, it is important to consider the possibility of
psychological reactance. The current study replicates earlier
research e.g., [6, 9, 17] in showing that psychological reac-
tance can be avoided by formulating the message in such
a way that it is not experienced as a directive. The current
study adds to earlier research that the message deliverer has
to be taken into account. That is, the current results suggest
that when the image that is sketched of the communicator
of a persuasive message consists of more social cues, more
psychological reactance will occur in response to that mes-
sage. Another possible explanation for the effect of social
agency on psychological reactance could be that the pres-
ence of a robotic agent caused greater reactance than mes-
sages without a robot due to vividness effects. Quick and
Stephenson [19] showed that the vividness of language use
(i.e., words that lead to better visualization of consequences
of behavior) can be perceived as threatening. For example,
Quick and Stephenson used messages containing the follow-
ing language use: “. . . exercising saves you from dying of a
massive heart attack, clogged arteries, morbid obesity, and
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being stressed out of your mind” (p. 474). However, as re-
ported in the Results section, analyses suggest that our ar-
tificial social agent was not seen as more threatening than
the text-only condition. Still, we did not directly measure
whether the artificial social agent was seen as more vivid
than the text-only condition, and therefore no strong con-
clusions can be drawn. Future research can further investi-
gate the interesting issue of vividness effects. Thereby, the
current research starts the investigation of the role of social
agency for psychological reactance.
The current study extends psychological reactance the-
ory [3, 4] by linking psychological reactance to the concept
of social agency. To our knowledge, the current study is the
first to make this connection. Thereby, it opens up many pos-
sibilities for future research. For example, other and perhaps
stronger manipulations of social agency and threat of mes-
sages might be investigated. That is, perhaps people might
easily experience psychological reactance when a human
social agent threatens their autonomy to choose, but peo-
ple might even more quickly experience psychological reac-
tance to even the slightest controlling message coming from
a non-human social agent. To answer that question future
research could investigate what happens when also a hu-
man messenger is put into the comparison. Future research
might also investigate our claim that psychological reac-
tance predominantly occurs when the threat comes from a
social agent and not when the threat comes from a non-social
entity (e.g., a tree blocking the road). That is, although in our
text-only condition social agency may have been low, fu-
ture research could compare the effect of a persuasive mes-
sage coming from a social agent to a limitation of people’s
autonomy coming from a completely non-social source. Fi-
nally, future research could examine whether the occurrence
of psychological reactance perseveres or even accumulates
when people interact with an artificial social agent in a task
that is more interactive in nature.
To come back to the psychological reactance you might
experience when someone wants to persuade you: The cur-
rent research indicates that it makes a difference which com-
municator brings the message. If—somewhere in the near
future—this messenger happens to be a robotic agent or a ro-
bot, the current research indicates that you are prone to expe-
rience more psychological reactance (indicated by feelings
of anger and negative cognitions) when this robotic agent or
robot has a higher social agency.
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